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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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December 3, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U. S. Position With Respect to the
Regulation, Limitation and Balanced
Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

REFERENCES: A. NSC 112
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated December 1, 1959
C. NSC Action No. 2152

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 426th Council meeting on December 1, 1959 (NSC Action No. 2152):


- a. Noted and discussed an interim report on the subject by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, Director, Joint Disarmament Study.
- b. Noted that the draft statement of a proposed long-range goal of the United States on arms control matters, presented at the meeting by Mr. Coolidge, [copy enclosed herewith] would subsequently be circulated to Council Members and Advisers so that they might provide the Secretary of State with any comments thereon after further study.

The above actions have been approved this date by the President. As background for further Council consideration of the subject of this memorandum, it is requested that this office receive a copy of any comments provided to the Secretary of State.

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This memorandum supersedes the reference memorandum of December 1, 1959, since it incorporates the amended and approved action in b above. It is therefore requested that all copies of the December 1 memorandum be destroyed in accordance with applicable security regulations.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Joint Disarmament Study

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The present policy of the United States on arms control matters should be to favor verifiable arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law; namely, a world in which:

1. Rules of international law prohibiting armed conflict between nations shall be in effect, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by an adequate international peace force.
2. National military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the international peace force, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation.

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10 December 1959

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Allen Dulles

THRU: Mr. Abbot Smith

FROM: Robert E. Matteson

SUBJECT: Coolidge Disarmament Proposals

1. I have read the Lay memo enclosing the Coolidge 3 paragraph statement of proposed policy and note that NSC members and advisers are requested to provide Mr. Coolidge with any comments they wish. Not knowing whether you intend to do this and realizing that your reaction to his December 1st report may not accord with what follows, I do not know whether my comment will be of any use. For whatever it is worth, however, I pass it on. I might also add that it takes into consideration the further elaboration Mr. Coolidge provided the Board in a session we had with him today.

2. The merits of his proposals - as they stand today - are namely these, in my opinion:

(a) they do away with the idea of a comprehensive, phased package - which has made negotiations difficult - if not impossible;

(b) they are simplicity itself - easily understood; relatively easy to negotiate; relatively easy to inspect; and - so far as individual measures go - relatively easy for the Administration and (when necessary) Congress - to accept;

(c) they have the further merit of clearly and strongly focusing attention on 3 important, simple, first steps - any one of which, if accomplished are important in and of themselves and might open the door to further important steps.

B. The principal criticisms I have are these:

(a) they will not be liked, I believe, by our principal Allies. The ~~French~~ will probably object to the Harstad plan plus the freeze and to the omission of a comprehensive disarmament plan. The ~~French~~ will object to the test suspension, to the omission of a missile proposal, and, possibly, to the omission of a comprehensive disarmament plan. The UK and Canadians will be, I should think, the principal objectors. They will probably object to the withdrawal of all previous positions, to the fact that the proposals do not go far enough, and to the negative public opinion and Soviet impact they are likely to produce - notwithstanding the ultimate goal proposal. No set of proposals will, of course, be liked by all Allies. My only point is that the probability is that these proposals will be less liked than what might be proposed;

(b) world public opinion - including the Soviet - will probably be adverse. Expectations have been aroused - and the result may look like the proverbial mess. They may even give the impression that the US has taken a long step backward. The proposals will undoubtedly be strongly criticized by influential Senators, by national organizations, other leaders of public opinion here and abroad, and by the Soviets on the grounds they do not go far enough;

(c) the proposals are, taken as a whole, cautious - at a time of great opportunity. The test proposal is - in effect - not a proposal since it is already policy. The outer space proposal is also in the present policy but has not yet been singled out for negotiation. If it will be, this will be very good. The third and final proposal is the 1957 Harstad version of the 1957 Stansett proposal with a freeze added. This never actually became policy - though there was reference in the policy to a

"limited European zone." If this is singled out and approved for negotiation with the Soviets, it too would be a significant step forward.

4. I believe a number of separable proposals should be added to Mr. Coolidge's recommendations which might be considered to be a second tier, to be negotiated after the present Coolidge proposals had been tried. These would be added with the idea of accepting as a primary objective - attempting now to stabilize the nuclear deterrent. They would also be added with the idea of gaining more public opinion and world-wide government support. They would be:

(a) a cut-off of production of nuclear material for weapons purposes;

(b) prohibition of transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material to other countries;

(c) the inclusion of missiles in "use of outer space for peaceful purposes";

(d) a zone of inspection in the Middle East;

(e) cessation of national missile testing and thereafter of national missile production.

Finally, in the first tier, some reductions ought to be added to the freeze in the European Zone proposal. An attempt should be made to include Communist China in any disarmament agreement which would be pertinent to China. Each of these separable proposals could be approved by the US in 1960. Based on past experience the negotiation and ratification would take at least until 1962 or 1963, particularly in view of the fact that they would not be negotiated until after the first group had been disposed of. The implementation would take at least a year longer.

5. Khrushchev's period of leadership offers an unparalleled opportunity to try to arrive at agreements in the mutual interest. This is due, I believe, to the fact that there has been a significant change in the USSR...since 1955 (others would say since 1953,

or 1957, or 1959). Khrushchev since 1955 has pushed hard the relaxation of tension policy (with tactical variations) because he genuinely believes it is the best road to Communist world domination. He - on the other hand - too often seems to fear such a policy and lack boldness in exploring what there is in such a policy that might also be in our interest. At a time when Khrushchev is in the saddle, when the President is ready to move, and the world's interest is focused on disarmament, the Coolidge proposals as they stand may have the effect of confirming a suspicion that we are not really interested in stabilizing the deterrent, stopping the arms race, or promoting a relaxation of tension. In other words, his proposals, in my opinion, are excellent as far as they go - but the criticism is that they don't go far enough.